The Capacity of Private Information Retrieval from Byzantine and
  Colluding Databases by Banawan, Karim & Ulukus, Sennur
ar
X
iv
:1
70
6.
01
44
2v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  5
 Ju
n 2
01
7
The Capacity of Private Information Retrieval from
Byzantine and Colluding Databases∗
Karim Banawan Sennur Ulukus
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742
kbanawan@umd.edu ulukus@umd.edu
June 6, 2017
Abstract
We consider the problem of single-round private information retrieval (PIR) from
N replicated databases. We consider the case when B databases are outdated (unsyn-
chronized), or even worse, adversarial (Byzantine), and therefore, can return incorrect
answers. In the PIR problem with Byzantine databases (BPIR), a user wishes to re-
trieve a specific message from a set of M messages with zero-error, irrespective of the
actions performed by the Byzantine databases. We consider the T -privacy constraint
in this paper, where any T databases can collude, and exchange the queries submitted
by the user. We derive the information-theoretic capacity of this problem, which is
the maximum number of correct symbols that can be retrieved privately (under the T -
privacy constraint) for every symbol of the downloaded data. We determine the exact
BPIR capacity to be C = N−2B
N
·
1− T
N−2B
1−( T
N−2B
)M
, if 2B+T < N . This capacity expression
shows that the effect of Byzantine databases on the retrieval rate is equivalent to re-
moving 2B databases from the system, with a penalty factor of N−2B
N
, which signifies
that even though the number of databases needed for PIR is effectively N − 2B, the
user still needs to access the entire N databases. The result shows that for the unsyn-
chronized PIR problem, if the user does not have any knowledge about the fraction
of the messages that are mis-synchronized, the single-round capacity is the same as
the BPIR capacity. Our achievable scheme extends the optimal achievable scheme for
the robust PIR (RPIR) problem to correct the errors introduced by the Byzantine
databases as opposed to erasures in the RPIR problem. Our converse proof uses the
idea of the cut-set bound in the network coding problem against adversarial nodes.
∗This work was supported by NSF Grants CNS 13-14733, CCF 14-22111, and CNS 15-26608.
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1 Introduction
The problem of preserving the privacy of the contents downloaded from open-access databases
has been a major area of research within the computer science community [1–5]. Many prac-
tical applications are related to the private retrieval problem, such as: protecting the identity
of stock market records reviewed by an investor, as showing interest in a specific record may
undesirably affect its value; and protecting the nature of restricted content browsed by ac-
tivists on the internet in oppressive regimes. In the seminal paper [1], Chor et. al. introduced
the problem of private information retrieval (PIR). In the classical PIR setting, a user wishes
to retrieve a certain message (or file) out of M distinct messages from N non-colluding and
replicated databases without leaking any information about the identity of the desired mes-
sage. To that end, the user prepares N queries, one for each database, in a single round,
such that the queries do not reveal the user’s interest in the desired message. Each database
responds truthfully with an answering string. The user needs to be able to reconstruct the
entire message by decoding the answer strings from all databases. A straightforward solution
for the PIR problem is for the user to download the entire database. This solution, however,
is highly inefficient. The efficiency of PIR systems is assessed by the PIR rate, which is the
ratio between the desired message size and the total downloaded symbols.
The computer science formulation of the PIR problem assumes that the message is of
length 1. The formulation considers optimizing two performance metrics, namely, the down-
load cost, which is the sum of the lengths of the answer strings, and the upload cost, which
is the sum of the lengths of the queries. Most of this work adopts computational guarantees
as a privacy constraint, in which the databases cannot infer any information about the iden-
tity of the desired message unless they solve certain computationally hard problems [3, 5].
Recently, the PIR problem is revisited by information theorists [6–9]. The problem is re-
formulated such that: the size of the message can be arbitrarily large, the upload cost is
ignored, and privacy is guaranteed in the information-theoretic sense. This formulation
gives rise to the PIR capacity notion, which is the supremum of PIR rates over all achiev-
able retrieval schemes. In the pioneering paper [9], Sun and Jafar determine the capacity
of the classical PIR model, and propose a greedy algorithm which is based on three princi-
ples: message symmetry, database symmetry, and exploitation of side information through
interference alignment as observed earlier in [10].
Several interesting extensions for the classical PIR problem are investigated following the
information-theoretic reformulation in [9], such as: PIR with T colluding databases (TPIR)
[11], where the privacy constraint should be maintained against any T databases; robust
PIR (RPIR) [11], where some databases fail to respond to the user; symmetric PIR (SPIR)
[12], where the privacy of the remaining messages should be maintained against the user in
addition to the usual user’s privacy; MDS-coded PIR (CPIR) [8, 13], where the contents of
the databases are not replicated, but coded via an (N,K) MDS code; multi-message PIR
(MPIR) [14], where the user wishes to jointly retrieve P messages; PIR under message size
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constraint L (LPIR) [15]; multi-round PIR, where the queries are permitted to be a function
of the answer strings collected in previous rounds [16]; MDS-coded symmetric PIR [17];
MDS-coded PIR with colluding databases [18–20], and its multi-message version [21].
A common assumption in these works is that the databases respond truthfully with the
correct answer strings. Since the answers are correct, the user can use the undesired symbols
downloaded from one database as side information at other databases. Furthermore, this en-
ables the user to distribute the requests for the desired symbols among the N databases. This
poses an interesting question, how can we manage to reconstruct the desired message with no
errors even if B databases respond with incorrect answer strings? This question has practical
implications. Returning to the examples presented earlier: The databases storing the stock
market records may not be updated simultaneously, therefore some of the databases may
store outdated versions of the messages and can introduce errors to the answering strings,
which in turn leads to failure to reconstruct the desired message. This scenario is referred to
in the literature as the unsynchronized PIR problem [22]. For the oppressive regime example,
some databases can be controlled by the regime, and these databases may return incorrect
answer strings on purpose to confuse the user. This scenario is referred to in the literature as
the PIR with adversarial databases problem [23, 24]. This motivates our interest in charac-
terizing the exact capacity of the PIR problem with Byzantine databases (BPIR). In BPIR,
there exist B databases, which are called Byzantine databases, that respond with erroneous
answer strings. The errors introduced by the Byzantine databases can be unintentional (as
in the case of databases storing a different copy of the message set), or even worse, can
be intentional (as in the case of maliciously controlled databases). In both cases, the user
needs to be able to reconstruct the desired message with no error, irrespective of the actions
performed by the Byzantine databases.
The BPIR problem was introduced in [23]. They propose a generic transformation from
schemes of RPIR to robust protocols that tolerate Byzantine servers, and give an explicit
Byzantine robust scheme when B ≤ T ≤ N
3
. [25] presents a fault-tolerant PIR scheme that
can cope with malicious failures for B ≤ T ≤ N
2
. [24] observes that allowing for list decoding
instead of unique decoding enlarges the feasible set up to B < N − T − 1. Their achievable
scheme allows for a small failure probability. The scheme depends on Shamir’s secret sharing
algorithm [26] and Guruswami-Sudan decoding algorithm [27]. The unsynchronized PIR
problem is investigated in [22], where they propose a two-round retrieval scheme. The
scheme returns the desired record by first identifying which records are mis-synchronized,
and then by constructing a PIR scheme that avoids these problematic records.
In this paper, we consider the single-round BPIR problem from N replicated databases
in the presence of B Byzantine databases that can introduce errors to the returned answer
strings. Other than the Byzantine databases, the remaining storage nodes store the exact
copy of the message set which contains M different messages, and respond truthfully with
the correct answer strings. We consider the T -privacy constraint, which permits colluding
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between any T databases to exchange the queries submitted by the user. Our goal is to
characterize the single-round capacity of the BPIR problem under the zero-error reliability
constraint and the T -privacy constraint. To that end, we propose an achievable scheme that
is resilient to the worst-case errors that result from the Byzantine databases. Our achievable
scheme extends the optimal scheme for the RPIR problem to correct the errors resulted
from the Byzantine databases, in contrast to the erasures introduced by the unresponsive
databases in RPIR. The new ingredients to the achievable scheme are: encoding the un-
desired symbols via a punctured MDS code, successive interference cancellation of the side
information, and encoding the desired symbols by an outer-layer MDS code. For the con-
verse, we extend the converse arguments developed for the network coding problem in [28]
and distributed storage systems in [29] to the PIR problem. This cut-set upper bound can
be thought of as a network version of the Singleton bound [30]. The upper bound intuitively
implies that a redundancy of 2B nodes is needed in order to mitigate the errors introduced
by the B Byzantine databases.
We determine the exact capacity of the BPIR problem to be C = N−2B
N
·
1− T
N−2B
1−( TN−2B )
M , if
2B + T < N . The capacity expression shows the severe degradation of the retrieval rate
due to the presence of Byzantine databases. The capacity expression is equivalent the TPIR
capacity with N − 2B databases with a multiplicative factor of N−2B
N
, which signifies the
ignorance of the user as to which N − 2B databases are honest. Note that our Byzantine
formulation includes the special case of the single-round unsynchronized PIR problem, if
the user has no knowledge about the number of mis-synchronized messages, and only knows
that the entirety of some B databases may be unsynchronized. This formulation differs
from the unsynchronized PIR setting in [22], where a small number of records S ≪ M are
mis-synchronized, and they allow for multi-round schemes. Under the assumptions of small
number of mis-synchronized records and utilizing multiple rounds of querying (assuming no
further mis-synchronization between the rounds) higher PIR rates may be achieved [22].
However, under our assumptions of up to the entire database being mis-synchronized and
allowing only a single-round of querying, the single-round capacity of the unsynchronized
PIR problem and the BPIR problem are the same.
2 Problem Formulation
Consider a single-round PIR setting with N replicated databases storing M messages (or
files). The messages W = {W1, · · · ,WM} are independent and uniformly distributed over a
large enough finite field Fq. Each message Wi ∈ F
L
q is a vector of length L (q-ary symbols),
H(Wi) = L, i = 1, · · · ,M (1)
H(W) = H(W1, · · · ,WM) =ML (2)
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Each database stores a copy from the complete set of messages W, i.e., this distributed
storage system applies an (N, 1) repetition code [13]. Denote the contents of the nth database
by Ωn. Ideally, Ωn =W for all n ∈ {1, · · · , N}.
In the PIR problem, a user wishes to retrieve a message Wi ∈ W without revealing any
information about the message index i. The user submits a single-round query Q
[i]
n to the nth
database. The user does not know the stored messages in advance, therefore, the message
set W and the queries are statistically independent,
I
(
W;Q
[i]
1:N
)
= I
(
W1, · · · ,WM ;Q
[i]
1:N
)
= 0 (3)
where Q
[i]
1:N = {Q
[i]
1 , Q
[i]
2 , · · · , Q
[i]
N} is the set of all queries to the N databases for message i.
Ideally, the classical PIR formulation assumes that all databases store the correct database
contents (i.e., up-to-date contents), and respond truthfully with the correct answering strings
A
[i]
1:N = {A
[i]
1 , · · · , A
[i]
N}. In the BPIR setting, on the other hand, there exists a set B of
databases, that is unknown to the user, such that |B| = B, which are called Byzantine
databases. These databases can respond arbitrarily to the user by introducing errors to the
answer strings A
[i]
B = {A
[i]
j : j ∈ B}, i.e.,
H
(
A[i]n |Q
[i]
n ,W
)
> 0, n ∈ B, |B| = B (4)
We assume that these Byzantine databases can coordinate upon submitting the answers.
In this paper, we do not assume a specific pattern to the errors. The remaining set of
databases B¯ = {1, · · · , N} \ B respond truthfully to the user, i.e., the answer strings of B¯
are a deterministic function of the queries and the correct contents of the databases W,
H
(
A[i]n |Q
[i]
n ,W
)
= 0, n ∈ B¯, |B¯| = N − B (5)
We consider a T -privacy constraint as in the TPIR problem in [11], where any T databases
can communicate and exchange the queries submitted by the user. To ensure the T -privacy
constraint, the queries to any set T ⊂ {1, · · · , N} of databases, such that |T | = T , need to
be statistically independent of the desired message index i, i.e.,
I
(
i;Q
[i]
T
)
= 0, for all T ⊂ {1, · · · , N}, |T | = T (6)
where Q
[i]
T are the queries submitted to the set T of databases.
We remark here to differentiate the actions of colluding between the databases which is
done to figure out the desired message, and coordination between the Byzantine databases
which is done to introduce errors in the answer strings. In addition to the difference in their
purposes, these two actions differ in the manner they are performed: colluding between any
T databases occurs upon receiving the queries from the user, while coordination between the
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B Byzantine databases occurs upon submitting the answers to the user. We do not assume
any specific relation between the T colluding databases and the B Byzantine databases.
The user should be able to reconstruct the desired message Wi, no matter what the
Byzantine databases do, i.e., if there exists a set of databases B¯, that is unknown to the
user, such that (5) holds, then the reliability constraint is given by,
H(Wi|A
[i]
1:N , Q
[i]
1:N) = 0, such that (5) holds (7)
We define the resilient PIR rate R for the BPIR problem as the ratio between the message
size L and the total download cost under the reliability constraint in (7) for any possible
action of the Byzantine databases, and the T -privacy constraint in (6), i.e.,
R =
L∑N
n=1H(A
[i]
n )
(8)
The capacity of BPIR is C = sup R over all possible single-round retrieval schemes.
In this paper, we follow the information-theoretic assumptions of large enough message
size, large enough field size, and ignore the upload cost as in [7,11,13]. A formal treatment of
the capacity under message size constraints can be found in [15]. The BPIR with colluding
databases reduces to the TPIR problem in [11] if B = 0.
Some scenarios that fit our formulation include:
• Unsynchronized setting [22]: In this case, there exists a set B of databases, such that
|B| = B, in which they store different versions of the database contents, i.e.,
Ωn 6=W, n ∈ B, |B| = B (9)
Note that unlike [22], we assume that the user has no knowledge about the fraction
of the messages that are mis-synchronized. Hence, our achievable schemes must be
resilient against the worst-case that the entirety of the database is mis-synchronized.
Furthermore, the scheme in [22] is a two-round scheme, hence we cannot compare our
rates with the rates in [22]; we consider only single-round schemes here.
• Adversarial attacks [23–25]: In this case, the databases in B intend to preclude the
retrieval process at the user by introducing a carefully-designed error sequence. This
can be done by altering the contents of the databases to an erroneous version as in the
unsynchronized setting; or by altering the answering strings themselves, i.e., the nth
database returns the answer string A˜
[i]
n such that,
A˜[i]n 6= A
[i]
n , n ∈ B, |B| = B (10)
or by doing both.
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3 Main Result and Discussions
The main result of this paper is to characterize the capacity of the BPIR problem under T -
privacy constraint, where B databases are adversarial (Byzantine) and can return malicious
answers, and at the same time the privacy should be kept against any T colluding databases.
Theorem 1 For the single-round BPIR problem with B Byzantine databases, and T collud-
ing databases, such that 2B + T < N , the capacity is given by,
C =
N − 2B
N
·
1− T
N−2B
1−
(
T
N−2B
)M (11)
=
N − 2B
N
·
(
1 +
T
N − 2B
+
T 2
(N − 2B)2
+ · · ·+
TM−1
(N − 2B)M−1
)−1
(12)
On the other hand, if 2B + 1 ≤ N ≤ 2B + T , then the user is forced to download the entire
database from at least from (2B + 1) different databases, hence C = 1
(2B+1)M
, which is the
trivial rate in the BPIR problem. Otherwise, the problem is infeasible and C = 0.
The achievability proof for Theorem 1 is given in Section 4, and the converse proof is
given in Section 5. We have a few remarks.
Remark 1 The BPIR capacity in (11) is the same as the capacity of PIR with T colluding
databases if the number of databases is N − 2B with a penalty factor of N−2B
N
. This means
that the harm introduced by the B Byzantine databases is equivalent to removing a part from
the storage system of size 2B, but the user still needs to download from all N databases, as
it does not know which N −2B databases are honest. This results in the penalty term N−2B
N
.
If B = 0, the expression in (11) reduces to
Ccolluded =
1− T
N
1−
(
T
N
)M (13)
which is the capacity expression in [11] as expected. Fig. 1 shows the severe effect of the
Byzantine databases on the retrieval rate for fixed T = 2 and M = 3 as a function of N .
Remark 2 Comparing the BPIR capacity in Theorem 1 with the robust capacity Crobust
in [11], where U databases are merely unresponsive,
Crobust =
1− T
N−U
1−
(
T
N−U
)M (14)
we note that the number of redundant databases, which are needed to correct the errors
introduced by the Byzantine databases, is twice the number of redundant databases needed
to correct the erasures introduced in the case of unresponsive databases. We also note that
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Figure 1: The effect of Byzantine databases on the BPIR capacity as a function of N for
fixed T = 2, M = 3.
the penalty factor is missing in the RPIR problem, since in the RPIR problem, the user does
not get the chance to download from the unresponsive databases, in contrast to the BPIR
problem, in which the user downloads answer strings from all databases. This is due to the
fact that the user cannot identify the Byzantine databases before decoding the entire answer
strings in the BPIR setting, while in the RPIR setting, the user identifies the unresponsive
databases as they simply do not return answer strings.
Remark 3 The trivial rate for the BPIR problem is 1
(2B+1)M
, which is much less than the
trivial rate without the Byzantine databases, 1
M
. The reason for this is that the user cannot
download the entire database only once in BPIR, but it must download (2B + 1) different
copies of the database in order to decode the desired message via majority decoding. If
N < 2B + 1, the capacity is C = 0, as the Byzantine databases can always confuse the user
to decode the desired message incorrectly.
Remark 4 When the number of messages is large, i.e., as M → ∞, the BPIR capacity
C → (N−2B
N
)(1− T
N−2B
) = 1− 2B+T
N
, i.e., for large enough number of messages, the capacity
expression acts as if there are no Byzantine databases and 2B + T databases are colluding.
Remark 5 If T and B are fixed and do not scale with N , i.e., T = B = o(N), then the
capacity is a strictly increasing function in N and C → 1 as N →∞. If the number of the
Byzantine databases scales with N , i.e., B = γN , where γ ∈
[
0, 1
2
(1− T
N
)
)
, then C → 1−2γ
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Figure 2: The asymptotic BPIR capacity C as N →∞ as a function of γ = B
N
.
as N →∞. If 2γ + 1
N
≤ 1 ≤ 2γ + T
N
, then the only possible rate is the trivial rate 1
(2B+1)M
.
As N → ∞, then γ → 1
2
, and C → 0. This entails that the asymptotic behaviour of the
BPIR capacity is a linear function with a slope of −2 as in Fig. 2, i.e., the asymptotic rate
as N → ∞ is decreased by twice the ratio of the Byzantine databases. A similar behaviour
is observed for secure distributed storage systems against Byzantine attacks in [29]. The
problem is infeasible if γ > 1
2
, i.e., C = 0. This feasibility result conforms with the best result
of a uniquely decodable BPIR scheme in [25] which needs B < N
2
.
Remark 6 Surprisingly, our retrieval scheme in Section 4 is a linear scheme in contrast to
the network coding problem in [28] that states that linear coding schemes are not sufficient.
We note that although the retrieval process is itself linear, the decoding process employs a
successive interference cancellation decoder, which is non-linear.
Remark 7 The capacity expression in Theorem 1 is also the capacity result for the unsychro-
nized PIR problem [22]. This occurs under the restriction to single-round schemes and the
assumption that the user only knows that there exist B databases that are unsynchronized,
but does not know the fraction of messages that are mis-synchronized. The achievability
scheme in Section 4 is a valid achievable scheme for the unsynchronized PIR problem, since
the adversary in the Byzantine setting is stronger. For the converse proof, we restricted the
actions of the adversarial databases to changing the contents of the stored messages, i.e.,
altering Ωn from W to W˜, which is the same setting as the unsynchronized PIR with no
restriction on the fraction of messages that can be mis-synchronized.
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4 Achievability Proof
In this section, we present an achievable scheme that is resilient to the errors introduced
by the Byzantine databases. The achievable scheme does not assume any specific error
pattern. Hence, our achievable scheme enables correct decoding of any desired message if
any B databases become outdated, or even worse, intentionally commit an adversarial attack
to confuse the user. The achievable scheme generalizes the RPIR scheme presented in [11].
Our scheme has two new ingredients, namely, correcting errors in the side information using
punctured MDS codes, and correcting errors in the desired message by an outer layer of
MDS code. Error correction in both cases is performed via a nearest-codeword decoder.
4.1 Preliminaries
We start by presenting some preliminary results that will be needed. The following lemma
states that if an MDS code is punctured by a puncture pattern whose length is smaller than
the minimum distance of the original MDS code, then it remains an MDS code [31].
Lemma 1 (MDS code puncturing [31]) If C is an (n, k) MDS code, then by puncturing
the code by a sequence of length z, i.e., deleting a sequence of size z from output codewords
of C, such that z < n− k, the resulting punctured code Cz is an (n− z, k) MDS code.
The second lemma is regarding the statistical effect of operating on a random matrix by a
deterministic full-rank matrix. The proof of this lemma can be found in [11].
Lemma 2 (Statistical effect of full-rank matrices [11]) Let S1,S2, · · · ,SM ∈ F
α×α
q be
M random matrices, drawn independently and uniformly from all α × α full-rank matrices
over Fq. Let G1,G2, · · · ,GM ∈ F
β×β
q be M invertible square matrices of dimension β × β
over Fq. Let I1, · · · , IM ∈ N
β be M index vectors, each containing β distinct indices from
{1, · · · , α}, then
{G1S1(I1, :), · · · ,GMSM (IM , :)} ∼ {(S1([1 : β], :), · · · ,SM([1 : β], :)} (15)
where ∼ denotes statistical equivalence, Si(Ii, :), Si([1 : β], :) denote β × α matrices with
rows indexed by Ii and {1, 2, · · · , β}, respectively.
The next lemma summarizes the code capabilities of handling errors and erasures for linear
block codes [32, Theorem 1.7].
Lemma 3 (Code capabilities [32]) Let C be an [n, k, d] linear block code over Fq. Let ρ
be the number of erasures introduced by the channel. Let τ ∈ N, such that 2τ+ρ ≤ d−1, then
there exists a nearest-codeword decoder that recovers all errors and erasures if the number or
errors (excluding erasures) is τ or less.
Lemma 3 implies that in the case of no erasures, the maximum number of errors τ ≤
⌊
d−1
2
⌋
.
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4.2 Motivating Example: M = 2 Messages, N = 5, T = 2, B = 1
Databases
Assume without loss of generality that W1 is the desired message. Let ai and bi be the ith
symbol mixture of messages W1 and W2, respectively. The specific construction of these
mixtures will be presented shortly. We begin the retrieval process by downloading TM−1 = 2
symbols from W1, which are a1, a2 as in [11]. By message symmetry, we download 2 symbols
from W2, which are b1, b2. By database symmetry, we download 2 symbols from W1 and 2
symbols from W2 from all other databases.
Now, we want to generate the maximum number of side information equations in order
to maximize the retrieval rate. From Lemma 3, we see that the number of errors that can
be corrected increases with d. We know that MDS codes meet the Singleton bound [30] with
equality, hence encoding both desired and undesired messages by MDS codes is desirable. In
addition, Lemma 3 implies a doubling effect, which suggests that in order to correct the errors
introduced by the Byzantine database, we should effectively consider N − 2B = 3 honest
databases. Consequently, considering any 3 databases, the number of undesired symbols is 6.
We note that any T = 2 of them can collude, therefore, we are left with 2 undesired symbols
that can be used to generate side information among the 2 colluding databases. Hence, each
database should get 1 side information equation b[11:15]. These side-information symbols can
be added to new desired symbols a[11:15]. The complete query structure is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: The query table for the case M = 2, N = 5, T = 2, B = 1.
DB 1 DB 2 DB 3 DB 4 DB 5
a1 a3 a5 a7 a9
a2 a4 a6 a8 a10
b1 b3 b5 b7 b9
b2 b4 b6 b8 b10
a11 + b11 a12 + b12 a13 + b13 a14 + b14 a15 + b15
Now, we specialize the query structure in Table 1, and identify the specific construction
of the mixtures a[1:15] and b[1:15]. For the desired message W1, considering any N − 2B = 3
honest databases, we see 9 distinct symbols. Therefore, the length ofW1 is L = 9, and we use
S1, which is a 9×9 random mixing matrix picked uniformly from the full-rank matrices over
F
9×9
q . These 9 mixed symbols are further mapped to a[1:15] by a (15, 9) MDS code generator
matrix MDS15×9, therefore,
a[1:15] =MDS15×9S1W1 (16)
For the undesired message W2, considering again any N − 2B = 3 honest databases, we
have 6 individual symbols from W2 in round 1. We should be able to reconstruct the side
information equations b[11:15] in round 2 from any 6 individual symbols, hence we get 6
11
random symbols from W2. This can be done by considering the first 6 rows of the random
mixing matrix S2 ∈ F
9×9
q . These randomly mixed symbols are further mapped to b[1:15] via
and MDS code with generator matrix MDS15×6, i.e.,
b[1:15] = MDS15×6S2([1 : 6], :)W2 (17)
To see the decodability: the worst-case scenario is that the Byzantine database commits
errors in all the symbols returned to the user. This means that the database commits 2
errors in the individual symbols from W1, 2 errors in the individual symbols from W2, and
1 extra error in the sum of a+ b.
Consider the codeword b[1:10]: this codeword belongs to (15, 6) MDS code with a sequence
of length z = 5 removed. Hence, this codeword belongs to (10, 6) punctured MDS code.
Since z = 5 < 15 − 6 = 9, the (10, 6) punctured MDS code is still an MDS code. Denote
the minimum distance of the (10, 6) punctured MDS code that results in b[1:10] by d
b
p. Then,
dbp = 10 − 6 + 1 = 5. Consequently, from Lemma 3, the (10, 6) punctured MDS code can
tolerate errors up to τb, such that
τb ≤
⌊
dbp − 1
2
⌋
= 2 (18)
Therefore, this code can correct all errors that can be introduced to the individual undesired
symbols b[1:10]. Let b
∗
[1:10] be the correct codeword of b[1:10]. Choose any 6 symbols from
b∗[1:10]. Now, since MDS15×6 matrix has the property that any 6 × 6 matrix is an invertible
matrix, then from any 6 symbols from b∗[1:10], the correct side information equations b
∗
[11:15]
are determined and canceled from the sums of a and b in round 2.
For the desired message W1: after removing the interference from W2, we are left with
a˜[1:15]. Note that this is not exactly a[1:15], because we canceled the correct side information
and not b[1:15]. However, the total errors in a˜[1:15] still is upper bounded by 3, since a˜[1:15] can
differ from a[1:15] only in the positions that correspond to Byzantine databases. The desired
message W1 is coded via (15, 9) MDS code. Then, the minimum distance for this code is
da = 15− 9 + 1 = 7. Consequently, this code can tolerate errors up to τa, such that
τa ≤
⌊
da − 1
2
⌋
= 3 (19)
Hence, all the errors in a˜[1:15] can be corrected, and we can obtain true a
∗
[1:15]. Consider the
first 9 symbols from a∗[1:15], without loss of generality, then
W1 = (MDS15×9([1 : 9], :)S1)
−1a∗[1:9] (20)
since MDS15×9([1 : 9], :)S1 is a 9× 9 invertible matrix.
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Therefore, despite Byzantine behaviour of B = 1 database, we decode the desired message
correctly. In addition, our achievable scheme can identify the Byzantine database as does the
scheme in [22] by comparing a∗[1:10] with a[1:10], and b
∗
[1:10] with b[1:10] and see which database
has introduced errors.
To see the privacy: we note that from any T = 2 databases, our achievable scheme
collects 6 symbols from a[1:15] and 6 symbols from b[1:15] indexed by I such that |I| = 6. For
the undesired message, we collect bI ,
bI =MDS15×6(I, :)S2([1 : 6], :)W2 (21)
∼ S2([1 : 6], :)W2 (22)
where (22) follows from Lemma 2 as any 6 × 6 matrix in MDS15×6 matrix is full-rank.
Therefore, the symbols bI are independent and uniformly distributed. For aI , we have
aI = MDS15×9(I, :)S1W1 (23)
= Ψ6×9W1 (24)
where Ψ = MDS15×9(I, :)S1 is a full row-rank matrix as any 6 rows inMDS15×9 are linearly
independent. Consequently, the symbols aI are also independent and uniformly distributed,
and aI ∼ bI for every 2 databases, where ∼ means that the involved random vectors are
statistically identical. Thus, the proposed scheme is 2-private; that is, despite colluding
behaviour of T = 2 databases, we have privacy.
Finally, the achievable resilient retrieval rate is R = 9
25
= N−2B
N
·
1− T
N−2B
1−( TN−2B )
M = C. In
comparison, the trivial rate for this system is 1
(2B+1)M
= 1
6
, as the user must download the
entire database from 3 different databases for correct decoding.
4.3 General Achievable Scheme
The general achievable scheme is performed in M rounds. The ith round includes all the(
M
i
)
combinations of the sums of any i messages. The scheme requires L = (N −2B)M . The
construction resembles the optimal scheme for RPIR in [11]. The new key ingredient in our
achievable scheme is the decoding procedure, which includes correcting the undesired sym-
bols by punctured MDS codes, successive interference cancellation to cancel the interfering
messages, and correcting the errors in the desired message by an outer layer MDS code.
4.3.1 General Description for the Scheme
1. Initialization: The scheme starts with downloading TM−1 mixed symbols from the
desired message from the first database. The specific construction of the mixture will
be specified shortly. The scheme sets the round index i = 1.
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2. Message symmetry: To satisfy the privacy constraint, the user downloads the same
number of mixed symbols from the undesired messages with all the possible combina-
tions, i.e., in the ith round, the user downloads
(
M−1
i
)
(N − 2B − T )i−1TM−i mixed
symbols from the remainingM−1 messages. The specific construction of the undesired
mixture will be specified shortly.
3. Database symmetry: The user repeats the same steps at all the databases. Specifically,
the user downloads
(
M−1
i−1
)
(N − 2B − T )i−1TM−i equations in the form of a desired
message mixture symbol and i − 1 mixed symbols from the undesired messages, and(
M−1
i
)
(N − 2B − T )i−1TM−i mixed symbols from the undesired messages only, from
each database.
4. Exploiting side information: The specific construction of the undesired mixtures should
be done such that in the (i+ 1)th round, the user should be able to generate N−2B−T
T
side information equations for each undesired symbol in the ith round. This fraction
is a consequence of considering N˜ = N − 2B honest databases only, and dividing the
undesired symbols from the N˜ − T databases among the T colluding databases. The
side information generated is added to a new mixed symbol from the desired message.
5. Repeat steps 2, 3, 4 after setting i = i+ 1 until i =M − 1.
4.3.2 Specific Construction of the Symbol Mixtures
Let Wm ∈ F
(N−2B)M
q , m ∈ {1, · · · ,M} be the message vectors, and Sm, m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}
be random mixing matrices picked independently and uniformly from the full-rank matrices
in F
(N−2B)M×(N−2B)M
q . From the general description of the scheme, we note that at the ith
round, the user downloads all possible combinations of the sums of any i messages. In the
following specific construction, we enumerate all the sets that contain a symbol from the
desired message and assign them labels L1, · · · ,Lδ. For each undesired message, we further
enumerate also all the sets that contain symbols from this undesired message and do not
include any desired symbols and assign them labels K1, · · · ,K∆. These sets construct the
undesired symbol mixtures and the corresponding side information.
For the desired message: Assume that the desired message is Wℓ. Let δ be the number
of the distinct subsets of {1, · · · ,M} that contain ℓ, then δ = 2M−1. Let Li, i ∈ {1, · · · , δ}
be the ith subset that contains ℓ. Assume without loss of generality, that these sets are
arranged in ascending order in the sizes of the sets |Li|. According to this order, we note
that L1 = {ℓ} and belongs to round 1. Round 2 contains sets L2, · · · ,L(M−11 )+1
, and so on.
Let X [ℓ] ∈ F
N(N−2B)M
q be the vector of mixtures that should be obtained from the desired
message Wℓ. Divide X
[ℓ] into δ partitions denoted by x
[ℓ]
Li
, each corresponds to a distinct set
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Li. Now, encode the desired message by a
(
N(N − 2B)M−1, (N − 2B)M
)
MDS code as,
X [ℓ] =


x
[ℓ]
L1
x
[ℓ]
L2
...
x
[ℓ]
Lδ

 =MDSN(N−2B)M−1×(N−2B)MSℓWl (25)
where x
[ℓ]
Li
is a vector of length N(N − 2B − T )|Li|−1TM−|Li| in Fq.
For any other undesired message: Consider the undesired message Wk, k ∈ {1, · · · ,M} \
{ℓ}. Let ∆ = 2M−2 be the number of distinct subsets that contain k and do not contain ℓ.
Let Ki, i ∈ {1, · · · ,∆} be the ith subset that contains k and does not contain ℓ with indices
in ascending order in the size of set |Ki|. Define u
[k]
Ki
to be the undesired symbol mixtures in
the |Ki|th round corresponding to message k among the Ki set. Define σ
[k]
Ki
to be the side
information symbols from message k among the Ki subset of undesired messages. These side
information equations are added to a desired message symbol in the (|Ki|+ 1)th round. For
each subset Ki, the undesired symbols and side information symbols are related via,[
u
[k]
Ki
σ
[k]
Ki
]
=MDSN
T
αi×αi
Sk
([
i−1∑
j=1
αj + 1 :
i∑
j=1
αj
]
, :
)
Wk (26)
where αi = (N − 2B)(N − 2B − T )
|Ki|−1TM−|Ki|, u
[k]
Ki
is a vector of length N
N−2B
αi, and σ
[k]
Ki
is a vector of length N−2B−T
T
· N
N−2B
αi. This implies that the side information σ
[k]
Ki
in the
(|Ki|+ 1)th round is completely determined by u
[k]
Ki
in the |Ki|th round. We note that these
choices of the dimensions ensure that the same number of desired and undesired symbols
exist in the |Ki|th round, and they are both equal to N(N − 2B − T )
|Ki|−1TM−|Ki|. We
further note that the N−2B−T
T
factor in the length of σ
[k]
Ki
, implies that we generate N−2B−T
T
side information symbols for each undesired symbol. We note that the same MDS matrix
is used for all messages k 6= ℓ that belong to the same subset Ki. This is critical to enable
interference alignment, and joint error correction. Let X [k] ∈ F
N(N−2B)M−1
q be the vector of
mixtures corresponding to message k 6= ℓ. Then,
X [k]=


u
[k]
K1
σ
[k]
K1
u
[k]
K2
σ
[k]
K2
...
u
[k]
K∆
σ
[k]
K∆


=


MDSN
T
α1×α1
0 · · · 0
0 MDSN
T
α2×α2
· · · 0
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 MDSN
T
α∆×α∆

Sk([1 : T (N−2B)M−1], :)Wk
(27)
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Now, we are ready to specify the queries. For every non-empty set M ⊆ {1, · · · ,M},
define Q
[ℓ]
M to be all queries related to set M,
Q
[ℓ]
M =


x
[ℓ]
L1
, M = L1 = {ℓ}
x
[ℓ]
Lj
+
∑
k∈Ki
σ
[k]
Ki
∃i, j :M = Ki ∪ {ℓ} = Lj∑
k∈Ki
u
[k]
Ki
∃i :M = Ki
(28)
We distribute the queries randomly and evenly among the N databases for each subset M,
and the construction is now complete.
4.4 Decodability, Privacy, and the Achievable Rate
First, we show how the decoding is performed. The first step is to correct the errors in the
undesired symbols in the Ki set in the |Ki|th round, so that we can generate the correct side
information in the (|Ki|+ 1)th round. Consider again the encoding,[
u
[k]
Ki
σ
[k]
Ki
]
=MDSN
T
αi×αi
Sk (Ji, :)Wk (29)
where Ji =
[∑i−1
j=1 αj + 1 :
∑i
j=1 αj
]
. Since the sum of linear codes is also a linear code, for
the every set Ki, i ∈ {1, · · · ,∆}, we have[∑
k∈Ki
u
[k]
Ki∑
k∈Ki
σ
[k]
Ki
]
= MDSN
T
αi×αi
∑
k∈Ki
Sk (Ji, :)Wk (30)
This enables joint error correction on the aligned sum. The minimum distance of this MDS
code is dKi = N
T
αi − αi + 1 =
N−T
T
αi + 1.
Now, in the |Ki|th round, the user downloads
∑
k∈Ki
u
[k]
Ki
which is a vector of length
N
N−2B
αi from all databases. The vector
∑
k∈Ki
u
[k]
Ki
belongs to
(
N
N−2B
αi, αi
)
punctured MDS
code with a puncturing sequence corresponding to the side information symbols, i.e., with a
puncturing sequence of length z = |σ
[k]
Ki
| = N−2B−T
T
· N
N−2B
αi. Therefore,
dKi − z − 1 =
N − T
T
αi −
N − 2B − T
T
·
N
N − 2B
αi (31)
=
2B
N − 2B
αi (32)
= 2B(N − 2B − T )|Ki|−1TM−|Ki| > 0 (33)
Thus, the
(
N
N−2B
αi, αi
)
punctured MDS code remains an MDS code with a minimum distance
dui, such that
dui =
N
N − 2B
αi − αi + 1 (34)
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=
2B
N − 2B
αi + 1 (35)
Hence, the punctured code can correct upto τui errors, such that
τui ≤
⌊
dui − 1
2
⌋
=
B
N − 2B
αi (36)
Each database contributes 1
N−2B
αi symbols from
∑
k∈Ki
u
[k]
Ki
, hence the Byzantine databases
can introduce at most B
N−2B
αi errors. Consequently, the punctured MDS code can correct
all errors in
∑
k∈Ki
u
[k]
Ki
. This results in a corrected undesired message vector
(∑
k∈Ki
u
[k]
Ki
)∗
.
Choose any αi symbols from
(∑
k∈Ki
u
[k]
Ki
)∗
. By the MDS property of the (N
T
αi, αi) MDS
code, any αi × αi submatrix is invertible, hence a correct version of the side information
vector, which is used in the (|Ki|+1)th round, can be generated. Denote this correct version
by
(∑
k∈Ki
σ
[k]
Ki
)∗
.
Now, we cancel the correct side information successively from each set Ki. Note that the
successive correction of side information gives rise to non-linearity in the decoding. After
interference cancellation, we are left with X˜ [ℓ], which is not exactly X [ℓ], as we cancelled the
correct side information from the sum and not the side information provided by the Byzantine
databases. This is not a problem, because X˜ [ℓ] and X [ℓ] differ in codeword positions if and
only if these positions belong to the Byzantine databases, hence the worst-case number of
errors in X˜ [ℓ] cannot increase. The desired message is encoded by (N(N − 2B)M−1, (N −
2B)M) MDS code with minimum distance dx, such that
dx = N(N − 2B)M−1 − (N − 2B)M + 1 (37)
= 2B(N − 2B)M−1 + 1 (38)
Each database returns (N − 2B)M−1 symbols from the desired message. The B Byzantine
databases can at most introduce B(N − 2B)M−1 errors. The outer MDS code can correct
up to τx errors, such that
τx ≤
⌊
dx − 1
2
⌋
= B(N − 2B)M−1 (39)
Thus, the user can correct all the errors introduced by the Byzantine databases to get a
correct vector
(
X [ℓ]
)∗
∈ F
N(N−2B)M−1
q . Consider any (N − 2B)M symbols from
(
X [ℓ]
)∗
.
Denote these symbols by x∗ℓ , and index them by Ix. Then, the user can decode Wℓ with zero
error via
Wℓ = (MDSN(N−2B)M−1×(N−2B)M (Ix, :)S1)
−1x∗ℓ (40)
This is true as matrix MDSN(N−2B)M−1×(N−2B)M (Ix, :)S1 is invertible by the MDS property.
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In addition, the user can identify the Byzantine databases by comparing the correct
versions of the undesired symbols at each cancellation step (
∑
k∈Ki
u
[k]
Ki
)∗, and the desired
symbols
(
X [ℓ]
)∗
by their counterparts from the retrieval process. Any change between the
correct vector and the retrieved vector implies that this database is a Byzantine database (or
unsynchronized). The user can expurgate the malicious nodes in this case as in [22, 28, 29].
Next, we show how the privacy is achieved. The queries for any T colluding databases
are comprised of T (N − 2B)M−1 mixed symbols from each message Wi, i ∈ {1, · · · ,M}. Let
these symbols be indexed by I. Denote the kth message symbols by x
[k]
I . For the desired
symbols, we have
x
[ℓ]
I =MDSN(N−2B)M−1×(N−2B)M (I, :)SℓWl (41)
Since |I| = T (N − 2B)M−1 < (N − 2B)M as 2B + T < N by construction, and due to the
MDS property, the symbols x
[ℓ]
I have full-rank. Hence, they are independent and uniformly
distributed. Furthermore, for any undesired message Wk, k 6= ℓ, we have,
x
[k]
I =


MDSN
T
α1×α1
(I1, :) · · · 0
0 · · · 0
...
...
...
0 0 MDSN
T
α∆×α∆
(I∆, :)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
Φ
Sk([1 : T (N−2B)
M−1], :)Wk (42)
where I =
⋃∆
j=1 Ij , and |Ij| = αj. Therefore, each submatrix in Φ is an αi × αi invertible
matrix by the MDS property. Hence, Φ is also an invertible matrix because it is a block-
diagonal matrix. By Lemma 2, we have
x
[k]
I ∼ Sk([1 : T (N−2B)
M−1], :)Wk (43)
Thus, symbols x
[k]
I are independent and uniformly distributed, and the privacy is guaranteed.
We next calculate the achievable resilient rate. We note that the scheme operates in
M rounds. At the ith round, the scheme downloads
(
M−1
i−1
)
(N − 2B − T )i−1TM−i equations
in the form of one desired symbol added to i − 1 symbols from the undesired messages,
and
(
M−1
i
)
(N − 2B − T )i−1TM−i undesired symbols only. Then, the total download in the
ith round is
(
M
i
)
(N − 2B − T )i−1TM−i from each database, i.e., the total download of the
scheme, D, is D = N
∑M
i=1
(
M
i
)
(N − 2B − T )i−1TM−i. The scheme decodes correctly the
desired message, which has length L = (N − 2B)M . Thus, the resilient retrieval rate is,
R =
L
D
(44)
=
(N − 2B)M
N
∑M
i=1
(
M
i
)
(N − 2B − T )i−1TM−i
(45)
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=
N − 2B
N
·
(N − 2B)M−1∑M
i=1
(
M
i
)
(N − 2B − T )i−1TM−i
(46)
=
N − 2B
N
·
(N − 2B)M−1
1
N−2B−T
∑M
i=1
(
M
i
)
(N − 2B − T )iTM−i
(47)
=
N − 2B
N
·
(N − 2B)M−1
1
N−2B−T
((N − 2B)M − TM)
(48)
=
N − 2B
N
·
(N − 2B)M − T (N − 2B)M−1
(N − 2B)M − TM
(49)
=
N − 2B
N
·
1− T
N−2B
1−
(
T
N−2B
)M (50)
which is the expression in Theorem 1. We have additional some about the achievable scheme.
Remark 8 We note that our achievable scheme is capable of identifying the Byzantine
databases by observing discrepancies between the corrected codewords of desired and undesired
messages and their counterparts from the retrieval process. Therefore, if multiple-rounds are
allowed in the achievable scheme, we can remove the databases that introduce errors at each
retrieval round, and achieve larger retrieval rates in future rounds. For instance, assume that
B˜ ≤ B databases commit errors and are identified to be Byzantine in the kth retrieval round,
then removing these databases from the system and downloading only from the remaining
(N − B˜) databases, we can achieve the following retrieval rate in the (k + 1)th round
R(k+1) =
N − B˜ − 2(B − B˜)
N − B˜
·
1− T
N−B˜−2(B−B˜)
1− ( T
N−B˜−2(B−B˜)
)M
(51)
=
N + B˜ − 2B
N − B˜
·
1− T
N+B˜−2B
1− ( T
N+B˜−2B
)M
(52)
In particular, if all B Byzantine databases act maliciously in the kth retrieval round and get
identified, i.e., B˜ = B, then we can achieve the following retrieval rate in the (k+1)th round
R(k+1) =
1− T
N−B
1− ( T
N−B
)M
(53)
which is the retrieval rate if B databases are just unresponsive.
Remark 9 Our achievable scheme can be seamlessly extended to the case of BPIR with U
unresponsive databases (as in the case of RPIR [11]) – also known in the literature as T -
private B-Byzantine (N − U)-out-of-N PIR as in [24]. The construction of the achievable
scheme can be done by replacing every N − 2B with N − 2B − U in the general achievable
scheme. Using Lemma 3, that states that correct decoding is possible if 2τ + ρ ≤ d− 1, and
considering the effect of the unresponsive databases as erasures, i.e., via ρ, the decodability
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holds for the BPIR problem with unresponsive databases. The retrieval rate in this case is,
R =
N − 2B − U
N − U
·
1− T
N−2B−U
1− ( T
N−2B−U
)M
(54)
The retrieval expression is the same as the BPIR capacity in (11) if the number of databases
is N−U . This in turn implies that the expression in (54) is the capacity of the BPIR problem
with unresponsive databases. The details of the construction and the analysis are omitted to
avoid repetition.
4.5 Further Examples
In this section, we present some further simple examples with tractable parameters of M ,
N , T , B for better understanding of the achievable scheme. Here, we use increased number
of messages (M = 3) and databases (N = 6) compared to the selections M = 2, N = 5 in
the motivating example in Section 4.2. In the following two subsections, we choose T = 1,
B = 2 and T = 2, B = 1, respectively, to show the different effects of colluding and Byzantine
behavior. We assume without loss of generality that the desired message is W1.
4.5.1 M = 3 Messages, N = 6, T = 1, B = 2 Databases
We denote the mixed symbols of messagesW1,W2,W3 by a, b, c, respectively. In this example
L = (N − 2B)M = 8, hence we use 8× 8 random mixing matrices denoted by S1,S2,S3. We
have L1 = {1},L2 = {1, 2},L3 = {1, 3},L4 = {1, 2, 3}. Also, for the undesired message W2,
we have K1 = {2},K2 = {2, 3}, and similarly for W3. The scheme starts with downloading
TM−1 = 1 symbol from each message from each database. Therefore, in round 1, the scheme
downloads x
[1]
L1
= a[1:6], u
[2]
K1
= b[1:6], and u
[3]
K1
= c[1:6]; see Table 2. For every undesired
symbol in round 1, we generate N−2B−T
T
= 1 side information symbols to be used in round 2.
The scheme constructs the side information symbols σ
[2]
K1
= b[7:12] based on the downloaded
symbols b[1:6], and similarly for σ
[3]
K1
= c[7:12]. Round 2 contains all combinations of the
sums of 2 messages. Round 2 adds one new symbol from the desired message with one
symbol of the generated side information from b, c. This results in the sums x
[1]
L2
+ σ
[2]
K1
=
a[7:12] + b[7:12], and the sums x
[1]
L3
+ σ
[3]
K1
= a[13:18] + c[7:12]. By message symmetry, we must
include the undesired symbol sum
∑
k∈K2
u
[k]
K2
= b[13:18] + c[13:18]; see Table 2. We note that
these undesired information equation is in the form of aligned sums. The undesired symbols
in round 2 generate the side information equations
∑
k∈K2
σ
[k]
K2
= b[19:24] + c[19:24]. These
side information equations are added to new symbols from the desired message to have
x
[1]
L4
+
∑
k∈K2
σ
[k]
K2
= a[19:24] + b[19:24] + c[19:24]. The query table is shown in Table 2.
The specific construction of the symbol mixtures are,
a[1:24] =MDS24×8S1W1 (55)
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Table 2: The query table for the case M = 3, N = 6, T = 1, B = 2.
DB 1 DB 2 DB 3 DB 4 DB 5 DB 6
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6
a7 + b7 a8 + b8 a9 + b9 a10 + b10 a11 + b11 a12 + b12
a13 + c7 a14 + c8 a15 + c9 a16 + c10 a17 + c11 a18 + c12
b13 + c13 b14 + c14 b15 + c15 b16 + c16 b17 + c17 b18 + c18
a19+b19+c19 a20+b20+c20 a21+b21+c21 a22+b22+c22 a23+b23+c23 a24+b24+c24
b[1:24] =


u
[2]
K1
σ
[2]
K1
u
[2]
K2
σ
[2]
K2

 =
[
MDS12×2 0
0 MDS12×2
]
S2([1 : 4], :)W2 (56)
c[1:24] =


u
[3]
K1
σ
[3]
K1
u
[3]
K2
σ
[3]
K2

 =
[
MDS12×2 0
0 MDS12×2
]
S3([1 : 4], :)W3 (57)
For the decodability, we note that B = 2 Byzantine databases can introduce at most 2
errors in b[1:6], 2 errors in c[1:6], 2 errors in b[13:18] + c[13:18], and 8 errors in a[1:24]. We note
that b[1:6] is encoded via (6, 2) punctured MDS code, which still is an MDS code because
z = 6 < 12 − 2 = 10. The (6, 2) punctured MDS code can correct errors up to ⌊6−2
2
⌋ = 2
errors. Then, the 2 errors in b[1:6] can be corrected. The same argument holds for c[1:6]. For
b[13:18]+ c[13:18], since the same generator matrix is used for b[13:18], c[13:18], and because of the
linearity of the code, the aligned sum is a codeword from (6, 2) punctured MDS code as well.
Thus, we can correct all the errors in the aligned sum b[13:18] + c[13:18]. Knowing the correct
undesired symbols results in decoding the correct side information symbols b[7:12], c[7:12] and
b[19:24] + c[19:24], respectively, by the MDS property. Cancelling these side information from
the answer strings, we are left with a˜[1:24], which are coded with an outer (24, 8) MDS code,
which is capable of correcting ⌊24−8
2
⌋ = 8 errors. Hence, the user can correct all the errors
introduced by the Byzantine databases and W1 is decodable.
For the privacy, from any individual database, the user asks for 4 mixed symbols from
each message. Because of the MDS property, the symbols from all messages are full-rank,
and hence they are independent and uniformly distributed. Thus, the scheme is private.
The resilient achievable rate is R = 8
42
= 4
21
= 1
3
· 4
7
= N−2B
N
·
1− T
N−2B
1−( TN−2B )
M = C.
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4.5.2 M = 3 Messages, N = 6, T = 2, B = 1 Databases
In this case L = (N − 2B)M = 64, and we use random mixing matrices S1,S2,S3 of size
64 × 64. The scheme starts by downloading TM−1 = 4 symbols from each message from
each database, namely, a[1:24], b[1:24], c[1:24]; see Table 3. The undesired symbols from b[1:24]
and c[1:24] create
N−2B−T
T
= 1 side information symbol for each undesired symbol in a single
database. Therefore, the scheme generates the side information b[25:48], c[25:48]. In round
2, these side information are added to a[25:48], a[49:72], respectively. Round 2 concludes by
applying message symmetry, and downloads b[49:72]+c[49:72]. These undesired symbols produce
b[73:96]+ c[73:96] as side information symbols for round 3. The query table is shown in Table 3.
The specific construction of the symbol mixtures are,
a[1:96] = MDS96×64S1W1 (58)
b[1:96] =
[
MDS48×16 0
0 MDS48×16
]
S2([1 : 32], :)W2 (59)
c[1:96] =
[
MDS48×16 0
0 MDS48×16
]
S3([1 : 32], :)W3 (60)
For the decodability, the Byzantine database can commit 4 errors in b[1:24], 4 errors in
c[1:24], 4 errors in b[49:72] + c[49:72], and 16 errors in a[1:96]. All layers of the undesired symbols
are encoded via (24, 16) punctured MDS code, which is still MDS code, and can correct up
to ⌊24−16
2
⌋ = 4 errors. Therefore, all the undesired symbols can be corrected, which in turn
generate the correct side information in all layers. By canceling the side information, we are
left with a˜[1:96], which is encoded by (96, 64) outer MDS code. This code can correct up to
⌊96−64
2
⌋ = 16 errors. Hence, the user can decode W1 reliably.
For the privacy, from any 2 databases, the user asks for 16 symbols from each message.
By the MDS property and Lemma 2, all these symbols are full-rank, and hence they are
independent and uniformly distributed. Therefore, the scheme is 2-private.
The resilient achievable rate is R = 64
168
= 8
21
= 4
6
· 4
7
= N−2B
N
·
1− T
N−2B
1−( TN−2B )
M = C.
Note that, for the same M , N , the achievable rate with T = 1, B = 2 in the previous
subsection, 4
21
, is smaller than the achievable rate with T = 2, B = 1 in this subsection, 8
21
,
which signifies that Byzantine behavior is a more severe adversarial behavior to cope with
compared to colluding behavior.
5 Converse Proof
In this section, we develop an upper bound for the BPIR problem. We adapt the cut-set
upper bound proof in [28, 29] to the PIR setting. The upper bound can be thought of as
a network version of the Singleton bound [30]. The upper bound intuitively asserts that
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Table 3: The query table for the case M = 3, N = 6, T = 2, B = 1.
DB 1 DB 2 DB 3 DB 4 DB 5 DB 6
a1, a2, a3, a4 a5, a6, a7, a8 a9, a10, a11, a12 a13, a14, a15, a16 a17, a18, a19, a20 a21, a22, a23, a24
b1, b2, b3, b4 b5, b6, b7, b8 b9, b10, b11, b12 b13, b14, b15, b16 b17, b18, b19, b20 b21, b22, b23, b24
c1, c2, c3, c4 c5, c6, c7, c8 c9, c10, c11, c12 c13, c14, c15, c16 c17, c18, c19, c20 c21, c22, c23, c24
a25 + b25 a29 + b29 a33 + b33 a37 + b37 a41 + b41 a45 + b45
a26 + b26 a30 + b30 a34 + b34 a38 + b38 a42 + b42 a46 + b30
a27 + b27 a31 + b31 a35 + b35 a39 + b39 a43 + b43 a47 + b47
a28 + b28 a32 + b32 a36 + b36 a40 + b40 a44 + b44 a48 + b48
a49 + c25 a53 + c29 a57 + c33 a61 + c37 a65 + c41 a69 + c45
a50 + c26 a54 + c30 a58 + c34 a62 + c38 a66 + c42 a70 + c30
a51 + c27 a55 + c31 a59 + c35 a63 + c39 a67 + c43 a71 + c47
a52 + c28 a56 + c32 a60 + c36 a64 + c40 a68 + c44 a72 + c48
b49 + c49 b53 + c53 b57 + c57 b61 + c61 b65 + c65 b69 + c69
b50 + c50 b54 + c54 b58 + c58 b62 + c62 b66 + c66 b70 + c70
b51 + c51 b55 + c55 b59 + c59 b63 + c63 b67 + c67 b71 + c71
b52 + c52 b56 + c56 b60 + c60 b64 + c64 b68 + c68 b72 + c72
a73+b73+c73 a77+b77+c20 a81+b81+c81 a85+b85+c85 a89+b89+c89 a93+b93+c93
a74+b74+c74 a78+b78+c78 a82+b82+c82 a86+b86+c86 a90+b90+c90 a94+b94+c94
a75+b75+c75 a79+b79+c79 a83+b83+c83 a87+b87+c87 a91+b91+c91 a95+b95+c95
a76+b76+c76 a80+b80+c80 a84+b84+c84 a88+b88+c89 a92+b92+c92 a96+b96+c96
the effect of the Byzantine databases on the retrieval rate is harmful as if 2B databases are
removed from the retrieval process, but the user still needs to access them. The settings
of PIR and network coding problem in [28] share that they are both planar networks, and
they both lack backward edges, as we consider here a single-round retrieval, and hence the
answer strings from the honest databases are not affected by the answers of the Byzantine
databases. However, some technical differences arise in the PIR setting:
1. Unlike the adversarial nodes in [28, 29], the Byzantine databases in PIR are not fully
omniscient, since they do not know which message the user wishes to retrieve (by defi-
nition of PIR). Consequently, we assume in the following that the Byzantine databases
alter the contents of the entire database.
2. In the PIR setting, the user does not know the entire codebook in advance, in contrast
to the network coding problem in [28].
For sake of deriving an upper bound, we make the following simplifications:
1. We assume that the actions of the Byzantine databases are restricted to altering the
contents of the entire database, i.e., the nth Byzantine database changes its contents
Ωn from W to W˜ , where W˜ 6= W. This restriction is valid from the converse point
of view, since it potentially results in a weaker adversary, which in turn results in a
higher rate. Note that, in this sense the Byzantine databases are reduced to being
unsynchronized databases (with unknown number of mis-synchronized messages).
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2. We further restrict the answering string from the nth database to be a deterministic
function fn(·), i.e., A
[i]
n = fn(Ωn, Q
[i]
n ), of the altered database Ωn. This restriction
also limits the capabilities of the Byzantine databases. This results in a further upper
bound on rate. Since we restrict the actions of the Byzantine databases to altering Ωn
only, we signify this dependence on Ωn by writing the answering string A
[i]
n as A
[i]
n (Ωn).
3. We can assume that the retrieval scheme is symmetric. This is without loss of general-
ity, since any asymmetric PIR scheme can be made symmetric by proper time sharing
without changing the retrieval rate [9, 13, 14], i.e.,
H(A
[i]
1 |Q) = H(A
[i]
2 |Q) = · · · = H(A
[i]
N |Q) (61)
This assumption remains true in the BPIR problem, because if the nth Byzantine
database returned an answering string which has H(A
[i]
n |Q) 6= H(A
[i]
j |Q) for some
honest database j, i.e., the answering string has a different length as a response to a
symmetric retrieval scheme, this database will be identified as a Byzantine database.
Hence, the errors introduced by the Byzantine databases can be mitigated and these
databases will be removed from the system afterwards. In addition, the restrictions
in assumptions 1 and 2 above imply that the Byzantine databases answer truthfully
to the queries based on their own (altered) Ωn. Therefore, the lengths of the answer
strings will be symmetric in response to a symmetric scheme.
The main argument of the converse proof is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Fix a set of honest databases U ⊂ {1, · · · , N} such that |U| = N − 2B, and
Ωn = W, for every n ∈ U . Then, for correct decoding of Wi, the answer strings A
[i]
U (W) is
unique for every realization of W, i.e., there cannot exist two realizations of the message set
W, W˜, such that W 6= W˜, and A
[i]
U (W) = A
[i]
U (W˜).
We have this following remark about Lemma 4 first, before we give its proof next.
Remark 10 Lemma 4 implies that the answer strings from any N−2B honest databases are
enough to reconstruct the desired message, since every realization of the message set produces
different answering strings from any N − 2B databases. This argument was previously used
by [28, Theorem 1] and [29, Theorem 6], as they show that the capacity of the adversarial
network coding problem and the adversarial distributed storage problem, respectively, is upper
bounded by the capacity of the edges of any cut in the network after removing 2B edges from
this cut. These edges correspond to the set U in our problem. The proof in [28, 29] relies
on the fact that in the presence of an adversary controlling B nodes, and for any distinct
messages w1 6= w2, a necessary condition for the receiver to not make a decoding error is to
have XU(w1) 6= XU(w2).
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Proof: Divide the set U¯ = {1, · · · , N} \ U into two sets B1, B2 such that |B1| = |B2| = B.
In the BPIR problem, we must guarantee correct decoding if the Byzantine databases are
any subset B ⊂ {1, · · · , N}, such that |B| = B, in particular, if the Byzantine databases are
either B1 or B2.
Now, assume for sake of contradiction, that there exists a valid retrieval scheme that
achieves correct decoding of Wi, and there exist two realizations of the message set W, W˜
such that W 6= W˜, and
A
[i]
U (W) = A
[i]
U (W˜) (62)
Two scenarios can arise:
1. The true realization of the database contents is W. In this case, if the adversarial
nodes are the databases indexed by B2, and they flip their contents ΩB2 into W˜, the
user collects the answer strings
(
A
[i]
B1
(W), A
[i]
B2
(W˜), A
[i]
U (W)
)
.
2. The true realization of the database contents is W˜. In this case, if the adversarial
nodes are the databases indexed by B1, and they flip their contents ΩB1 into W, the
user collects the answer strings
(
A
[i]
B1
(W), A
[i]
B2
(W˜), A
[i]
U (W˜)
)
.
Since A
[i]
U (W) = A
[i]
U (W˜), there is no way for the user to differentiate between the two
scenarios. Hence, the user commits an error either directly (if W and W˜ differ in Wi) or
indirectly (if W and W˜ differ in any message other than Wi, as the user fails in canceling
the interference from the answer strings). This is a contradiction to the reliability constraint
H(Wi|A
[i]
1:N , Q
[i]
1:N) = 0. 
Now, we continue with the main body of the converse proof. From Lemma 4, the answers
A
[i]
U (W) are unique for every W, hence restricting the decoding function to these answers
uniquely determineWi, i.e., there exists no further confusion about the correct database con-
tents W, and the answering strings are designed to retrieve Wi from this W. Consequently,
if the true realization of the database is W, we can write
R =
L∑N
n=1H(A
[i]
n )
(63)
≤
L∑N
n=1H(A
[i]
n |Q)
(64)
=
N − 2B
N
·
L
(N − 2B)H(A
[i]
1 |Q)
(65)
=
N − 2B
N
·
L∑
n∈U H(A
[i]
n (W)|Q)
(66)
≤
N − 2B
N
· CT (|U|) (67)
=
N − 2B
N
· CT (N − 2B) (68)
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=
N − 2B
N
·
1− T
N−2B
1−
(
T
N−2B
)M (69)
where CT (·) is the capacity of the PIR problem with T colluding databases as a function
of the number of databases. Here, (65) follows from the symmetry assumption, (66) follows
from the fact that A
[i]
U (W) can decode Wi correctly and then
L
∑
n∈U H(A
[i]
n (W)|Q)
is a valid
upper bound on the retrieval rate under the T -privacy constraint if the accessed databases
are restricted to U , which is further upper bounded by the TPIR capacity CT (|U|) in (67)
as CT (|U|) is the supremum of all rates that can be achieved using the set of databases U
under the T -privacy constraint, and (69) follows from the capacity expression in [11].
6 Conclusions and Future Directions
In this paper, we investigated the PIR problem from N replicated databases in the presence
of B Byzantine databases, and T -colluding databases from an information-theoretic perspec-
tive. We determined the exact capacity of the BPIR problem to be C = N−2B
N
·
1− T
N−2B
1−( T
N−2B
)M
.
The capacity expression shows the severe degradation in the retrieval rate in the presence
of Byzantine databases. The expression shows that in order to correct the errors introduced
by the adversarial databases, the system needs to have 2B redundant storage nodes. The
retrieval rate is further penalized by the factor N−2B
N
, which reflects the ignorance of the
user which N − 2B databases are honest. The BPIR capacity converges to C → 1 − 2γ
as B, N → ∞, B = γN , where γ is the fraction of Byzantine databases. For large enough
number of messages, the BPIR capacity approaches C → 1− 2B+T
N
. We extended the optimal
scheme for the RPIR problem to permit error correction of any error pattern introduced by
the Byzantine databases. The new key ingredients in the achievable scheme are: encoding
the undesired messages via a punctured MDS code, successive interference cancellation to
remove the interfering messages, and encoding the desired message by an outer-layer MDS
code. For the converse, we adapted the cut-set bound, which was originally derived for the
network coding problem against adversarial nodes, for the PIR setting.
The BPIR problem can be extended in several interesting directions. According to our
formulation here, the capacities of unsynchronized and Byzantine PIR problems are the
same. However, in the unsynchronized PIR problem, if the user knows in advance that at
most S messages are mis-synchronized, and if S is small with respect to M , the user can
potentially achieve higher rates than our formulation here, in particular, if it uses a multi-
round scheme as in [22]. In addition, in modeling the mis-synchronization, if we consider some
specific attack/error patterns (e.g., during mis-synchronization the stored data goes through
a noisy channel with a known model), then the user can tailor an error mitigation procedure
that fits these attack/error models explicitly, in contrast to our formulation here, where we
assumed that the user is prepared for the worst-case errors of any structure. Finally, while
26
we assumed that the B Byzantine databases can be any one of the
(
N
B
)
possible subsets,
the problem can be extended to the case where only a certain subset of all possible
(
N
B
)
Byzantine configurations is possible as in [33] which considered a limited collusion model.
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